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The Relevance of Tax Information in Other Comprehensive Income 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Given the general notion that more transparency, i.e. additional disclosure in financial 
accounting is beneficial per se on the one hand, and on the other hand given increasing 
scepticism about an information overload in financial statements, this study investigates the 
relevance of specific tax accounting information. For other comprehensive income (OCI), 
disclosure regarding deferred taxes on OCI items is required. We focus on whether the tax 
information given is relevant to the financial statement reader by using an experimental 
design, which allows us to manipulate the existence of tax information only, ceteris paribus. 
Participants, expert users and students make judgments regarding the financial performance, 
investment condition and tax position of the firm. The results do not support the notion that 
such deferred tax information in OCI is relevant. The (non-)existence of tax information 
made no difference in these judgments. This result is in contrast with perceptions of standard 
setters and should be borne in mind when considering further development of IAS 1 and IAS 
12. Previous research on tax disclosure and on OCI disclosure does not cover deferred tax in 
OCI. Our results are novel and the method used allows for the isolation of the effects that we 
search for. 
 
Key words: deferred taxes, other comprehensive income, income tax disclosure, experimental 
study, information processing 
 
 
  
The Relevance of Tax Information in Other Comprehensive Income 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the main purposes of financial statements is to provide outsiders with information and 
insight into the financial and economic state of a firm, enhancing transparency is one of the 
main drivers of financial reporting. Its role can be ascertained by performing a simple word 
search. Even though reference to transparency is not explicit in the framework1 itself, 
searching the IASB website for the term yields approximately 3,000 results (as compared to 
the four qualitative characteristics: understandability, 1,100; relevance, 3,100; reliability, 
2,100; and comparability, 5,300).2 A closer look at the usage reveals that reference is mostly 
about “enhancing” transparency, “improving”, “ensuring”, “promoting”, “increasing”, 
“strengthening” and the like. 
 
The means that providing transparency to users of financial statement involves additional 
disclosure, in order to reduce information asymmetry, reduce transaction costs and thus 
reduce the cost of capital and enhance market value and firm value. As a result, disclosure 
requirements in general have increased considerably in recent years. As a reaction to ever 
increasing disclosure requirements, complaints of an information overload arise, claiming 
that too much disclosure may obscure true transparency (EFRAG 2011; PwC 2011; KPMG 
2011; ESSEC 2013; Raedy, Seidman and Shackelford 2011; Groves 1994). Simply adding 
more contents to the financial statements does not necessarily increase value-relevance or 
decision usefulness to the users of such information. In fact, research results regarding the 
benefits of further disclosure are mixed, also with regard to OCI disclosure on the one hand 
and tax disclosure on the other. 
 
In the field of tax accounting, a particular need for additional information disclosure led to 
the amendment of IAS 12. The Standard now requires, among other additional information, 
that an entity separately disclose (deferred) taxes on OCI items, either on the face of the OCI 
statement or in the notes for annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2012. This new 
                                                 
1  Nor in the Discussion Paper, “A Review of the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting”, 
DP/2013/1. 
2  Search in November 2013. 
disclosure requirement can be seen as measures that follow the recent agenda of IASB3 which 
address prevalent doubts on usefulness of OCI and users' little confidence in the relevance of 
OCI. With a particular concern on related tax effects, IASB takes the view that 
disaggregating taxes on OCI items would improve the clarity and transparency of OCI (IAS 1, 
BC66). "Users of financial statements often requested further information on tax amounts 
relating to components of other comprehensive income, because tax rates often differed from 
those applied to profit or loss." (IAS 1, BC 68). 
 
However, there are opposing views asserting that allocating taxes to each OCI components 
can be arbitrary and involve a high degree of subjectivity due to undefined tax rates (IAS 1, 
BC67). If tax information in OCI is perceived to be irrelevant and thus does not influence 
users' assessment process, the intended benefits of the new disclosure requirement by IASB 
would not be realized.  
 
Consequently, this paper focuses on one specific aspect of disclosure: we attempt to 
determine whether tax information in OCI matters; whether actual users' behaviour meets 
regulatory bodies’ expectation. More precisely, the question is: Is the tax information given 
in OCI relevant? 
 
According to the IFRS conceptual framework, financial information is relevant when it 
makes a difference in users’ decision making4 (IASB 2010). In order to make a difference in 
decision making, the information must make a difference in the judgment that results from 
such information. We therefore assume the tax information to be relevant if it influences the 
financial statement reader’s judgment of the firm. To this end, we test the reader’s judgment 
in an experimental setting. In this regard, our study differs materially from other studies on 
the value relevance of disclosure. 
 
                                                 
3 “I do not think it is right to regard OCI as a largely irrelevant number which should preferably be 
buried in the notes. True, Other Comprehensive Income is often of a less certain nature than Profit or Loss. But 
that does not make OCI meaningless. Especially for financial institutions with large balance sheets, OCI can 
contain very important information. It can give indications of the quality of the balance sheet”. Hans 
Hoogervorst, chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board at the KASB/Korea Accounting 
Institute Seminar in Seoul, Korea (IASB 2011). 
4  IFRS conceptual framework QC 6: Relevant financial information is capable of making a difference in 
the decisions made by users. Information may be capable of making a difference in a decision even if some 
users choose not to take advantage of it or are already aware of it from other sources. See also DP/2013/1 4.9. 
The topic of our paper is not whether presentation of tax details should rather be included on 
the face of the statement or in the notes; research results indicate quite clearly that 
information given on the face of the balance sheet or income statement is better received. We 
focus rather on whether the information given (in the best available format: on the face of the 
income statement) is relevant as such. 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that focuses on tax in OCI. There are several studies 
that test either the decision usefulness of OCI, or the decision usefulness of (deferred) tax 
accounting. These studies focus less on information processing of the actual readers and 
perceptions of income tax disclosures. To be more specific, what has been missing in prior 
research is a focus on the effect of additional tax disclosure specifically induced by OCI. Our 
study differs from the prior works in that it investigates whether the information on deferred 
taxes generated by OCI items (certain fair value measurements, pension accounting and 
currency conversion) would change the users' understanding of the firm's income tax position 
and overall financial condition. 
 
To this end, we focus on the recent amendments of IAS 12 and IAS 1, demanding separate 
disclosure of tax on OCI items for the sake of “clarity and transparency” (IAS 1, BC65). To 
test the effect of such tax information, we use an experiment which allows us to manipulate 
the existence of tax information only, ceteris paribus. As opposed to the dominating 
empirical-archival research on the relevance of tax information, the strength of an 
experimental setting lies in its internal validity. On the one hand, the experiment allows 
controlling for all information and data that participants receive. Their response can therefore 
be directly attributed to the treatment (i.e. the non-/availability of tax disclosure). On the 
other hand, the relevance of tax information is assessed by directly inquiring participant´s 
judgement, instead of relying on proxies which are inevitably flawed, and which are required 
for an empirical-archival setting.  
 
Participants were expert users and students. They received a set of statements and gave their 
judgment on the financial performance, investment conditions and tax position of the firm. 
One group received tax details on OCI items, while the other group read the OCI items on a 
net-of-tax basis. The results are, in short, that the tax information made no difference – which 
is in contrast to the persistent proposals of extensive disclosure requirements in financial 
reporting. 
 This paper proceeds as follows: section 2. studies the background in literature, section 3. 
presents the hypothesis and the research design, section 4. analyses the results and controls 
and section 5. presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Research Background and Prior Literature 
 
The focus of our research, the relevance of deferred tax information in OCI, is based on two 
lines of literature: relevance of tax disclosure on the one hand, and relevance of OCI on the 
other. 
 
2.1. The usefulness of tax information in financial statements 
 
Our study testing the effect of specific tax information draws on the literature of tax 
accounting discussing the usefulness of tax disclosure. The underlying assumption is that 
accounting information in general, and tax disclosure specifically, is considered to be value 
relevant to equity investors (Barth, Beaver and Landsman 2001). For instance McAnally, 
McGuire and Weaver (2010) and Atwood et al. (2011) find that tax items of stock options 
provide value relevant information in terms of predictive-ability for future cash flow. This 
future-oriented aspect of tax information is highly utilized by equity investors in security 
valuation and thus reflects current earnings power. In this respect, Lev and Nissim (2004) 
empirically test the contemporary earnings impacts by showing a stronger association 
between the tax-to-book income ratio with current earnings-price ratios. With a particular 
concern for deferred taxes, empirical studies find a positive association of deferred tax 
accounts with firm value (Ayers 1998) and the value of the equity in terms of stock returns 
(Givoly and Hayn 1992). A negative relationship between deferred taxes and common stock 
value is also documented (Chandra and Ro 1997; Chaney and Jeter 1992). Although the 
directions of the correlations differ, past studies support the informative attributes of deferred 
tax accounts which are taken into account by investors through the market’s perception of 
deferred tax assets and liabilities as real assets and liabilities (Chang, Herbohn and Tutticci 
2009). 
 
On the other hand, there is a stream of research severely doubting the value-relevance of tax 
disclosure. Taking example cases of bond raters’ judgments, the studies of Huss and Zhao 
(1991) and Chattopadhyay, Arcelus and Srinivasan (1997) investigate whether the existence 
of deferred taxes would influence the corporate bond rating. Both studies show no difference 
in bond ratings resulting from different treatment of deferred taxes. Such a negligible impact 
is arguably attributed to the non-discounting features of deferred taxes (Huss and Zhao 1991) 
or the cost exceeding the benefits provided by an incremental improvement for deferred tax 
contents (Chattopadhyay, Arcelus and Srinivasan 1997). With respect to the detailed book-
tax difference, Raedy, Seidman and Shackelford (2011) find little evidence that the equity 
market prices differently and conclude that such detailed tax disclosures matter less to the 
equity market. Such observations demonstrate that investors do not perceive the deferred tax 
as decision-relevant information and thus less likely incorporate deferred taxes in assessing 
the firm value (Chludek 2011). 
 
Another notable research area concerns whether earnings management results from subjective 
judgments involved in tax accounting, such as estimating deferred taxes and deferred tax 
valuation allowances. A majority of empirical studies draw the conclusion that managers' 
earnings management (Schrand and Wong 2003; Phillips, Pincus and Rego 2003; Phillips et 
al. 2004; Christensen, Paik and Stice 2008) and a firm's opportunistic tendency (Gordon and 
Joos 2004; Poterba, Rao and Seidman 2010) are indicated by deferred tax expense and its 
valuation allowance. These particular tax accounts are in this sense decision-relevant to users 
who need to distinguish genuine operating earnings effects from artificial earnings driven by 
manipulation with deferred tax accruals (Kumar and Visvanathan 2003). 
 
Equally importantly, tax disclosure can also include misleading contents which undermine 
the value-relevance. Overesch and Schreiber (2006) show that the relevance of tax 
information under IAS 12 depends on the respective type of tax planning in which a firm 
engages. The effective tax rate (ETR) would be another good example. Despite the increasing 
disclosure of ETR in the notes of the financial statements, the limitation of ETR is well 
documented (Wilkie and Limberg 1993; Dunbar and Sansing 2002), suggesting that ETR is 
not so much related to a firm's performance or tax preferences and thus ETR is not able to 
explain a firm's tax planning practices. Deficiency in financial reporting of income taxes is 
also identified by C. Bauman, M. Bauman and Halsey (2001), who examine the financial 
statement income tax footnotes of Fortune 500 firms with a contextual approach. They find 
that earnings management effects of the deferred tax assets allowance cannot be determined 
solely from the financial disclosure, and suggest that financial disclosures still need to 
improve. 
 
The unfavourable views on the usefulness of tax disclosure in terms of value-relevance and 
misleading contents are somewhat understood as a reaction to the information complexity. 
Plumlee (2003) investigates how information complexity affects financial analysts’ use of 
financial information by differentiating complexity of six tax law changes. The results 
indicate that the more the information adds tax complexity, the less the financial analysts 
integrate such information into their forecast of effective tax rates. It can also be seen that 
observed analyst misinterpretation is mainly caused by the implications of the deferred taxes 
which require subsequent tax adjustments when tax rates change. Along the same line, 
implementing new income tax accounting standards, such as Financial Interpretation No. 485 
in the United States, can even further increase the complexity of tax accounting, for the sake 
of enhancing financial transparency (Blouin and Robinson 2012), although it would reveal 
corporate tax shelter activities (Lisowsky, Robinson and Schmidt 2013). This inevitable 
increased complexity might consequently produce confusion and unfamiliarity to users (Chen, 
Danielson and Schoderbek 2003; Chludek 2011) and thus undermines decision-usefulness. 
 
In summary, the findings from prior literature indicate that the relevance of tax information 
and its usefulness are evaluated differently in different settings. Although the theoretical aim 
of value-relevance of (deferred) taxes is set out by principle, its practical effects appear to be 
rather mixed, as shown in the findings from empirical studies. These findings demonstrate 
that the contents of tax disclosure are not necessarily meaningful and relevant to the users. 
Some favourable views on tax-relevance seem to be undermined by information overload and 
complexity that users have to deal with. 
 
2.2. Disclosure in other comprehensive income 
 
In practice, OCI is often criticized by financial experts, and business media perceive OCI to 
obscure a firm’s real performance (Rapoport 2011). It is critically regarded as “the 
accounting dustbin” (Guthrie 2011) or a way of accounting that “hides unwanted clutter” 
(Financial Times 2011). For instance when analysing the credit quality of companies, 
                                                 
5 FASB Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, an interpretation of FASB 
Statement No. 109. 
financial analysts rarely take OCI as it is; they usually sort out components in OCI when 
implementing their valuation models (Emrick, Wasden and Young 2006). The prior empirical 
research demonstrates mixed results and inconclusive views on the value relevance of OCI 
through the lens of the capital market reaction as well as its influence on investors’ 
perspectives of a firm.  
 
Kubota, Suda and Takehara (2011) find significant information in the OCI items which 
associate with stock returns. A need for disclosing more disaggregated and itemized 
information is supported by testing some particular items of OCI, foreign currency translation 
adjustments (Pinto 2005) and pension transition adjustments (Mitra and Hossain 2009), 
which demonstrate the significant relation to firm value and stock returns. In contrast, Cahan 
et al. (2000) argue that it is unnecessary to disclose such OCI items separately based on their 
evidence showing no incremental value relevance of two selective OCI items, namely fixed 
asset revaluation and foreign currency translation reserve adjustments. 
 
In line with sceptical views on the informative role of OCI, further analyses suggest little 
value-relevant and decision-useful content in OCI. For example Dhaliwal, Subramanyam and 
Trezevant (1999) test whether comprehensive income has a better correlation with future 
operating cash flows, future income stock returns and stock price, as compared to net income. 
They find a weak function of comprehensive income in predicting future cash flows and 
future earnings. Similar results of low value-relevance are documented by testing the 
correlation between the components of OCI and a firm’s value (O’Hanlon and Pope 1999; 
Kanagaretnam, Mathieu and Shehata 2009; Cheng, Cheung and Gopalakrishnan 1993), which 
indicates no significant explanatory power for OCI items in their results. 
 
Although the market reactions relating to the contents of OCI are rather uncertain, OCI can 
also be utilized as a firm's performance indicator, such as return on equity (ROE). Fernández 
and Arana (2010) evaluate whether the impact of comprehensive income on ROE is greater 
than that of traditional net income. By analysing the 2004-2008 data of Spanish public 
companies, they show a statistically significant finding that the impact on ROE is greater 
when comprehensive income is applied, as opposed to the net income, particularly during the 
2008 financial crisis. Given the fact that OCI is incremental to traditional net income, these 
results imply that OCI contains relevant information which adds validity to an indicator of 
corporate performance, such as ROE. 
 Other studies focus on presentation of OCI information, providing that users’ perceptions and 
utilization may differ by income definitions (Biddle and Choi 2006), categories of contents of 
such information and locations of the contents, i.e. types of financial statements (Maines and 
McDaniel 2000). For instance Chambers et al. (2008) explain that, in the context of the 
comprehensive income disclosure, investors pay greater attention to the statement of change 
in equity than to the financial performance (i.e. income statement), considering the fact that 
the components of OCI affect the firms’ equity and retained earnings. On the other hand, 
Hirst and Hopkins (1998) suggest that a clear presentation of OCI items in the income 
statement, rather than the equity section, would better assists expert users in analysing 
accounting transactions that are associated with the earnings management conditions. 
In short, there are mixed findings regarding the informative role of OCI contents and the role 
thereof in influencing the market and investors. Some highlight its positive role in financial 
reporting, whereas substantive parts of the literature cast doubt on its relevance. Considering 
these mixed results on the relevance of deferred tax information on the one hand and on OCI 
on the other, one can conclude that the relevance of deferred tax information in OCI is at least 
questionable. 
 
3. Research Design 
 
3.1. Hypotheses 
 
IAS 1 allows several ways of disclosure of deferred tax on OCI items.6 Three ways of 
disclosure can be found in practice: (i) all details on the face of the OCI statement (gross 
amounts of income/expense, with deferred tax as separate line-items beneath the respective 
                                                 
6 IAS 1.90: An entity shall disclose the amount of income tax relating to each item of other 
comprehensive income, including reclassification adjustments, either in the statement of profit or loss and other 
comprehensive income or in the notes. 
IAS 1.91: An entity may present items of other comprehensive income either: 
 (a) net of related tax effects, or 
 (b) before related tax effects with one amount shown for the aggregate amount of income tax relating to 
 those items. 
If an entity elects alternative (b), it shall allocate the tax between the items that might be reclassified 
subsequently to the profit or loss section and those that will not be reclassified subsequently to the profit or loss 
section. 
OCI items), (ii) gross amounts of income/expense, with one aggregated deferred tax line-item 
on the face of the OCI statement, and with details in the notes and (iii) net amounts of 
income/expense, with details on deferred tax per OCI item in the notes. In any case, an entity 
is required to disclose the allocation of income tax expense or benefit to each individual 
component of OCI. In its basis of conclusions, the IASB explicitly refers to the clarity and 
transparency that is sought, noting that these requirements (IAS 1, BC65): "… help to 
improve the clarity and transparency of such information, particularly when components of 
OCI are taxed at rates different from those applied to profit or loss". 
 
We can conclude that deferred tax disclosure in OCI is meant to provide relevant and useful 
information to users and thus be appreciated by the stock market. The aim of this study is to 
evaluate the relevance of incremental information on deferred taxes disclosed in OCI. 
Relevance is afforded when such information affects users' perceptions of the firm's financial 
and tax position. The resulting null hypotheses therefore are: 
H0a. Financial statement user’s perception of the firm’s overall financial 
performance does not differ when detailed deferred tax information is presented in 
other comprehensive income. 
 
H0b. Financial statement user’s perception of the firm’s investment conditions does 
not differ when detailed deferred tax information is presented in other comprehensive 
income. 
 
H0c. Financial statement user’s perception of the firm’s tax position does not differ 
when detailed deferred tax information is presented in other comprehensive income. 
 
Little can be said on the expected results or the expected sign of an effect. As previous 
studies do not strongly support one or view the other, the results are open. 
 
3.2. Experimental setup 
 
To test the hypotheses, we use an experiment. We model the experiment and the testing of the 
results along the lines of Anandarajan et al. (2008), who use a similar approach for the 
question as to whether the presentation format of stock-option reporting matters. Our main 
testing instruments are two different versions of OCI in the consolidated comprehensive 
income statements which we manipulate regarding the manner of disclosing deferred taxes in 
OCI. As the focus of our paper is not on the location of the tax information (OCI or notes), 
we distinguish only between providing all deferred tax details in OCI or not providing such 
details, instead showing net-of-tax amounts only. To illustrate, Figure 1 below summarizes 
our research design. 
<Insert Fig. 1 about here > 
 
3.3. Participants 
 
We choose our participants at two levels: expert users and students. The experts are financial 
professionals and practitioners in the field of accounting, auditing or tax. They mostly include 
tax advisors and certified public accountants (71% of the participants are qualified tax 
advisors7 and/or auditors; 90% are employed in a tax consulting/audit firm). Not all of them 
have IFRS experience, but all have a strong accounting background. During a tax and 
accounting conference which was held at the WU Vienna University of Economics and 
Business in April 2013 (Wiener Bilanzrechtstage 2013) participants were invited to stay after 
the end of the conference and participate in a research project which is related to IFRS 
reporting. 
 
The students are participants in the Master Program in Tax and Accounting (Steuern und 
Rechnungslegung) at WU Vienna University of Economics and Business. The student data 
were collected in May 2013, during a class in international taxation.8 As previous education 
includes financial reporting and international accounting, students are assumed to have 
considerable knowledge and a good understanding of the field. Half of these students also 
work part-time in tax/accounting practice (50% of the student participants are employed by a 
tax consulting/audit firm), and usually seek a professional career in accounting, auditing or 
tax. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
3.4. Test instrument and questionnaire 
 
We design our test instrument, after thorough screening, based on the financial statement of a 
multinational corporation. The criteria for choosing the respective MNC are listing on the 
                                                 
7 In Austria, certified tax advisors possess a university degree, at least three years of practice and they 
must have passed an extensive examen on tax and accounting (financial, managerial). They can be considered 
expert not only in tax but also in financial reporting. The reason lies in the close tax link in Austria. 
8 Neither of the authors was involved in teaching the class as professor or similar. 
German prime market (DAX), IFRS reporting, detailed reporting of deferred tax on OCI on a 
per-item basis. Further, we chose an MNC with comparatively high amounts of deferred 
taxes in OCI, to make sure that, within a realistic setting (i.e. not exaggerating), tax 
information may matter (i.e. not understating). Such procedure allows identifying a statement 
of supposedly high quality, generally in line with IFRS, with realistic amounts and adequate 
relative importance of deferred tax on OCI. The original model statement presents OCI items 
net of tax, with deferred tax on OCI items in sufficient detail in the notes. For the 
manipulation, we amend the OCI section by inserting these exact tax details.  The only 
difference between two versions of the financial statements is the OCI section in the 
comprehensive income statement, to the extent of disclosure of deferred taxes. 
 
To eliminate the possibility that participants may be able to identify the model company and 
thus might be biased in their judgment, we divide the amounts of the model financial 
statements by two, maintaining the internal consistency of the statements. The statements are 
distributed in a neutral format to participants. We do not provide any company-specific 
information except clarifying that it is a multinational public company named “ABC Group”. 
The experiment materials are labelled neutrally as “A” for the case “Net of Tax” and “B” for 
the case “Tax Detail”. 
 
For the questionnaire, we mostly refer to the list of questions used in the study of 
Anandarajan et al. (2008) which we modify moderately according to our focus on tax.  The 
questionnaire is composed of three parts: judgment questions, demographic data and 
manipulation check. The judgment questions enquire as to the participants’ perceptions of the 
firm’s overall financial performance, investment conditions and tax position, generally using 
a nine-point Likert scale, with 1 being “the most favourable and positive opinion” and 9 
being “the most unfavourable and pessimistic opinion”. Only regarding profitability 
(Question 5), we ask respondents to rate the future profitability of the company by using a 
three-point scale, where 1 is “decrease”, 2 is ”remain” and 3 is “increase”. By requesting 
demographic data and professional background information, we collect, among other things, 
the participants' occupations, the field of profession, education levels and experience with 
IFRS. Finally, one last question tests the participants’ acknowledgement of the 
(non-)disclosure of deferred tax information in the comprehensive income statement. This 
particular question is a manipulation check which allows us to determine whether the 
participants recall correctly the presence or absence of deferred tax information. Given that 
the mother tongue of all participants is German, all questions and financial statements are 
prepared in the German language so as to eliminate any possibility of misinterpretation or 
misunderstanding. Before executing the experiment, the questionnaires and financial 
statements are cross-checked by other two independent German native speakers. 
 
3.5. Test procedures 
 
The experiment first underwent a pilot with participants with knowledge of IFRS reporting. 
Their timing, feedback and comments are reflected in improving our experiment structures. 
In the actual setting, we carry out test procedures in three steps. First, we randomly allocate 
participants to one of the two groups, A or B, with identification numbers (maintaining 
anonymity). Second, we distribute instructions and explain that there is no right or wrong 
answer for this experiment, while not revealing our intentions. After verifying their 
understanding of the instructions, we distribute the two sets of questionnaires for 
demographic data and judgment questions, and provide the financial statements to the 
respective group. Group A receives financial statements ‘A’ which do not contain detailed 
deferred tax information in OCI; the financial statements with detailed tax closures in OCI, 
version ‘B’, are provided to Group B. Participants are allowed to use as much time as they 
think necessary to complete the questionnaires, which is generally around 15 minutes. Third, 
after having collected questionnaires and financial statements from the participants, we 
distribute the final manipulation check. 
 
Given that there is no “better” or “more successful” way to answer the questionnaire, and 
given that, in particular for practitioners, any kind of compensation can be only symbolic, 
compensation is not offered to participants. 
 
In brief, Figure 2 below presents the framework and process of our experiment. 
 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
 
To determine financial performance, three questions on the financial condition (Q1), on the 
ability of the group to meet its payment obligations in a timely manner (Q3) and on its 
profitability (Q5) are used. Investment condition is tested by asking about the riskiness of 
investing in shares of the firm (Q2), on future growth perspective (Q4) and on the 
attractiveness of the investment in shares of the firm (Q6). Finally, the perception of the tax 
burden of the firm (very low to very high) is tested (Q7). 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Analysis 
 
Table 2 illustrates the demographic variables. The results do not hint to insufficient 
randomization. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
For the manipulation check, which asks whether the OCI statement contained detailed tax 
information, the correct answer for Case “Net-of-Tax” (marked as “A” in the materials) 
should be "no", as they see only net of deferred tax account information; whereas subjects of 
the Case “Tax Detail” (indicated as “B” in the materials) should answer "yes", as they see the 
gross amounts and the subsequent deferred taxes. The test results confirm the validity of the 
test for the Case B “Tax Detail”, as most of the participants passed the test (93%); however 
for the Case A “Net-of-Tax”, only 57% of participants answered correctly. This low 
percentage of correct answers is mainly due to the results of student group with Case A "Net 
of Tax". In the next section 4.2, we analyze this result when we control the subjects for 
further investigation. In short, we interpret this result to mean that the extent of deferred tax 
disclosure in the OCI may be not distinguishable to users. The results are summarized in 
Table 3 below. 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Due to the non-normal distribution of the data, we use the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (Mann-
Whitney U). The result for all participants, shown in table 4, reveals that for none of our 
seven questions can the null hypothesis be rejected; none of the p-values is even close to 
significance. In other words, the assumption that detailed disclosure of tax makes no 
difference cannot be rejected. At an aggregated level,9 table 4.1 illustrates the results of two 
judgment categories (financial performance, investment conditions) where individual 
questions fall into categories as shown in Figure 2. The results by category again have high p-
values and support our results, as previously stated. 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
<Insert Table 4.1 about here> 
 
In addition to the non-parametric analysis, confirmation and further information can be given 
by ordered Logit and Tobit regressions,10 which include demographic variables. Most 
importantly, the treatment (with or without detailed tax information) does not lead to 
significant results, for none of the seven questions, nor for the aggregate investment condition 
and financial performance. The results above are thus supported. 
 
The other control variables tested are: passing of manipulation check (yes/no); subject (expert 
vs. student); years of experience; education; IFRS experience; number of consolidated annual 
statements of listed corporations reviewed during the past three years; age; and gender. 
 
Of these, one specific aspect of prior professional experience shows some significance: the 
number of consolidated annual statements of listed corporations reviewed during the past 
three years.11 Other measures for professional experience (years of experience; IFRS 
experience) are insignificant. Only for question 5 (on future development of the firm’s net 
income) is participant qualification (expert vs. student) highly significant (p = 0.000). For all 
other questions, it is not significant. Other than that, independent variables do not provide any 
significant results. In particular, the judgment does not differ significantly depending on the 
passing of the manipulation check. Testing the aggregate judgments on financial performance, 
again participant qualification (expert vs. student, p = 0.003) and three-year experience 
                                                 
9 The data was aggregated by calculating the mean answers for each category. The profitability judgment 
from question 5 (1: decrease, 2: remain, 3: increase) was translated to the 9-point Likert scale as 8: decrease, 5: 
remain, 2: increase, in order to form valid means and in order not to overemphasize extreme values. Question 7 
on the tax position was not included in the aggregation as it represents a category in its own. 
10 Further supported by ordered Probit; tables available upon request. 
11 For questions Q1, Q2, Q3 on the 10% level, for Q6 on a 5% level; further, gender is significant for Q4 
and age is significant for Q7, both on a 10% level. 
(p=0.068) are significant.12 For the aggregate judgments on investment conditions, none of 
the variables prove significant. To summarize: the results from the non-parametric test (that 
detailed disclosure of tax makes no difference cannot be rejected) are strongly confirmed. 
Other variables that may have an influence on the judgment of participants are, in some cases, 
participant qualification and the number of consolidated annual statements of listed 
corporations reviewed during the past three years. However, these results do not prove to be 
robust and should not be over-interpreted. 
 
4.2. Controls 
 
Even though not significant in the regression analysis, the weak results of the manipulation 
check call for further exploration. Table 5 shows that most of the expert participants 
answered correctly, but students’ results are mixed. Only 33% of the Case A “Net-of-Tax” 
student group answered correctly, whereas all students in the Case B “Tax Detail” group 
answered the manipulation check correctly. Regardless of the treatment, 83% of the students 
(33 students out of 40 in total) perceived that there is tax information. 
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
The reasons for the weak manipulation check results for students are unclear. On the one 
hand, the insufficient expertise (lack of knowledge about OCI or deferred taxes in OCI) or 
perceived demand effects (students were from a tax class and might infer that somehow tax 
must have been in the questionnaire) may play a role. On the other hand, one may conclude 
that deferred tax information in OCI is so irrelevant that its (non-)existence is not even 
noticed by students. Whatever the reason, further analysis is called for. 
 
When including only those subjects (experts and students) who passed the manipulation 
check, the results in Table 6 confirm that the different treatment leads to no significantly 
different judgment. Likewise insignificant results by aggregated judgment categories 
(financial performance, investment conditions) are summarized in Table 6.1. We enhance the 
validity of the results by excluding subjects who failed manipulation check - still the 
                                                 
12 Tobit regression. 
outcomes of all questions are quite similar to the results of all participants as shown in the 
Table 4 and 4.1. This observation appears to carry weight toward a doubtful view that 
visibility or notice-ability of deferred tax information in OCI to the users would be weak.  
 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
<Insert Table 6.1 about here> 
 
As mentioned, one could assume some demand effects from the manipulation check for 
students leading to a strong inclination to answer the manipulation check in the affirmative. 
In this case, a “yes” does not necessarily mean that students really took notice of tax in OCI, 
and all student results are to be regarded with scepticism. As a consequence, when 
disregarding the student group and focusing only on experts, Table 7 and Table 7.1 illustrate 
the results by each question and by judgment category. Again, the results do not allow for the 
rejection of H0, there is not a significant difference in judgment by treatment among experts. 
 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
<Insert Table 7.1 about here> 
 
Further, the question arises as to whether such insignificant results may stem from the lack of 
IFRS experience. Subsample 1 addresses IFRS experience by sorting out the data having 
IFRS experience and passed manipulation test. It shows very insignificant results as well, i.e. 
the (non-)existence of deferred tax in OCI is irrelevant. The same result is seen for all other 
controls, without any exception for all judgment questions. Table 8 illustrates further three 
subsamples. 
 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
 
The findings for all these subsamples show that there is no statistically significant difference 
even after we enhance the test validity with regard to manipulation check and professional 
background. 
 
Thus, the overall results given in Table 4 hold under all conditions. Given such a 
homogeneous outcome, we cannot reject the any of the three null hypotheses. (H0a, H0b or 
H0c). Questions 1, 3 and 5, and their aggregate measure test the users’ perception of firm’s 
financial performance (H0a). Questions 2, 5 and 6 and their aggregate measure the users’ 
perception of the firm’s investment condition (H0b). For both cases, the respective null-
hypothesis cannot be rejected. Not even the results on the straightforward final question 7 on 
the tax position (H0c) support the relevance of our manipulation. In short, our results cannot 
confirm that additional disclosure of deferred taxes on OCI items is relevant to the users of 
financial statements. 
 
4.3. Limitations 
 
This study is subject to some limitations. First, the test design does not allow conclusions as 
to whether the irrelevance of the information is due to the fact that the deferred tax on OCI 
items is irrelevant or due to the fact that OCI in itself is considered irrelevant. The literature 
lends support to both possible causes, and we cannot identify which of them prevails. Indeed, 
perhaps both are equally true. 
 
Second, there may be a self-selection bias among the experts. They were invited to participate 
after having attended a full-day conference. They were informed that the research project 
concerns IFRS accounting. However, given these facts, we believe that those individuals who 
are interested in IFRS and/or scholarly research were those who stayed, which should not 
interfere with the results. 
 
Third, the external validity of data from students is questionable, as is often the case. Our 
controls show, on the one hand, that the students’ results do not differ from experts’ results 
(which support external validity), while on the other hand, the manipulation check for 
students was weak (which reduces external validity). However, the experts’ results speak for 
themselves and confirm the overall results. 
 
Further, the sample size is – even though quite large for experiments – limited. Greater 
sample size generally decreases type II error and a larger sample size would increase 
confidence in the null hypothesis. Greater sample size however meets practical constraints of 
availability of participants, in particular experts.  
 
Finally, the question arises as to whether the lack of compensation to subjects reduces 
external validity, as subjects may not put the same effort into the task when not being 
rewarded. At least for the experts group, this assumption is weak, given that the selection 
procedure ensured the intrinsic motivation of subjects. Furthermore, adequate compensation 
for experts (opportunity cost) is precluded by budgetary constraints. For the students group, 
in addition to the weakness of the manipulation check, as mentioned, in fact validity may be 
limited. Nevertheless, we believe that the tests of experts only suffice to confirm the results 
and provide external validity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Disclosure in financial reporting in general and in tax accounting in particular has become 
more comprehensive, and is justified with the need for transparency, as well as the need for 
relevant information. These are also the main reasons for recent amendments of IAS 12 and 
IAS 1 which increase the requirements for disaggregated disclosure on tax in the financial 
statements. This study attempts to evaluate whether doubts as to the benefits of additional 
disclosure are well founded. We investigate whether one specific issue of tax disclosure, 
deferred taxes in OCI, is relevant to users. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper 
that focuses on tax in OCI. Other studies, in particular on the decision usefulness of OCI or 
on the decision usefulness of (deferred) tax accounting, do not focus on information 
processing of the actual readers and perceptions of income tax disclosures. 
 
Our results demonstrate that there is no significant difference between two treatments of 
(deferred) tax information in OCI; we therefore cannot confirm that detailed information on 
deferred tax on a per-item basis was relevant to the judgment of financial statement readers 
regarding the financial performance, investment condition and tax position of the model firm. 
Tax information in our test setting made no significant impact on the judgment of test 
participants.  
 
The IASB has put some emphasis on the disclosure of tax information in OCI, and has given 
only little importance to doubts that were brought forward during the due process, such as 
possible arbitrary tax allocation, lack of availability of data, and subjectivity of tax allocation. 
The trust that the IASB has put in the relevance of such information however cannot be 
supported. Our results cast doubt on the IASB agenda of proposing extensive (tax) disclosure 
requirements in financial reporting. 
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Figures	
Fig. 1. Experimental design 
 
Case A “Net-of-Tax” 
(OCI without detailed disclosure of 
deferred taxes) 
Case B “Tax Detail” 
(OCI with detailed disclosure of 
deferred taxes) 
 
Instrument 
Testing materials are a set of financial statements excluding the notes, for 
the fiscal years 2011 and 2012: 
∙ Statement of Financial Position 
∙ Comprehensive Income Statement 
∙ Cash Flow Statement 
∙ Statement of Changes in Equity 
 
Treatment 
Individual OCI items are recognized 
net of deferred tax on the face of the 
comprehensive income statement 
(i.e. there is no broken-down detailed 
deferred tax information in OCI) 
Individual OCI items are 
recognized at gross amounts; 
deferred taxes are allocated to each 
line item of OCI on the face of the 
comprehensive income statement. 
 
  
Fig. 2. Framework for the effects of the presence of deferred tax details in OCI 
 
PRESENTATION OF DEFERRED TAXES IN OCI 
Case A “Net-of-Tax” Case B “Tax Detail” 
Deferred taxes on OCI are netted against 
each OCI item and thus not shown in the 
comprehensive income statement (nor 
elsewhere in the statements) 
Deferred taxes are allocated to each OCI 
item, details of deferred tax effects are 
shown in the comprehensive income 
statement. 
 
 
INFORMATION PROCESSING 
Does ABC Group report deferred taxes in its comprehensive income statement? (Yes/No) 
 
 
JUDGMENT 
Financial performance 
 Financial condition 
 Payment obligation 
 Profitability 
 
Investment conditions 
 Growth perspective 
 Investment risk 
 Investment attractiveness 
 
Tax position 
 Tax burden 
 
  
Tables	
 
Table 1: Composition of participants 
 
 Experts Students Total 
Case A “Net-of-Tax” 25 21 46 
Case B “Tax Detail” 24 19 43 
Total 49 40 89 
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Table 2: Statistics on demographic variables 
  Case N Mean Std. dev. t P value 
 
No. of years experience Case A “Net-of-Tax”  45 8.31 9.6 0.0075 0.994 
 Case B “Tax Detail”  40 8.29 10.07   
       
Education level1  Case A “Net-of-Tax”  46 2.43 0.58 -0.23 0.8204 
 Case B “Tax Detail”  43 2.46 0.67   
       
Age Case A “Net-of-Tax”  46 33.96 11.94 0.27 0.7875 
 Case B “Tax Detail”  43 33.27 11.68   
   (Yes) (No)   
Experience with IFRS Case A “Net-of-Tax”  46 28% 72% 0.44 0.6642 
 Case B “Tax Detail”  43 33% 67%   
       
No. of financial statements under 
IFRS reviewed in the past 3 years 
Case A “Net-of-Tax”  44 3.79 5.94 -1.05 0.2973 
Case B “Tax Detail”  43 6.55 16.1   
   (Male) (Female)   
Gender  Case A “Net-of-Tax”  46 52% 48% 0.78 0.4362 
  Case B “Tax Detail”  43 60% 40%     
 1Education:  Doctor=1 Master =2 Bachelor=3 High school=4
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Table 3: Statistics on manipulation questions 
Treatment N Yes No 
Manipulation 
check passed 
Case A “Net-of-Tax”  46 43% (n=20) 57% (n=26) 57% (n=26) 
Case B “Tax Detail” 43 93% (n=40) 7%  (n=3) 93% (n=40) 
Total 89 
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Table 4: Statistics on judgment questions 
Questions Treatment  N Median Mean Std. dev. 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
        
1. Financial condition Case A “Net-of-Tax” 46 3 3.65 1.4176 0.6106 
(1: very good, 9: very poor) Case B “Tax Detail”  43 3 3.51 1.3161  
        
2. Investment risk Case A “Net-of-Tax” 46 3 3.80 1.3270 0.4865 
(1: low risk, 9: high risk) Case B “Tax Detail”  43 4 3.91 1.1509  
        
3. Payment obligation Case A “Net-of-Tax” 46 3 3.37 1.6514 0.9530 
(1: very good, 9: very bad)  Case B “Tax Detail”  43 3 3.40 1.6056  
        
4. Growth perspective Case A “Net-of-Tax” 44 3 3.48 1.2102 0.6088 
(1: very good, 9: very bad)  Case B “Tax Detail”  42 3 3.67 1.4595  
        
5. Profitability Case A “Net-of-Tax” 44 2 2.11 0.9205 0.7606 
(1: decrease, 2: remain, 3: Increase)  Case B “Tax Detail”  42 2 2.07 0.8083  
         
6. Investment attractiveness Case A “Net-of-Tax” 45 3 3.78 1.2772 0.7516 
(1: very attractive, 9: very unattractive) Case B “Tax Detail”  43 4 3.88 1.4834  
        
7. Tax burden Case A “Net-of-Tax” 46 6 5.93 1.4205 0.7936 
(1: very low, 9: very high)  Case B “Tax Detail”  43 6 5.84 1.5876   
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Table 4.1: Statistics on judgment categories: all participants 
Questions Treatment  N Median Mean Std. dev. 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
        
Financial performance Case A “Net-of-Tax” 46 4.17 3.91 1.1209 0.9572 
(1: very good, 9: very poor) Case B “Tax Detail”  43 3.67 3.88 1.1997  
        
Investment conditions Case A “Net-of-Tax” 46 3.33 3.66 1.0429 0.3035 
(1: low risk, 9: high risk) Case B “Tax Detail”  43 3.67 3.83 1.0319  
 
The category of financial performance is composed of Q1 Financial condition, Q3 Payment obligation and Q5 Profitability. The category of investment conditions is 
composed of Q2 Growth perspective, Q4 Investment risk and Q6 Investment attractiveness. The data was aggregated by calculating the mean answers for each category. The 
profitability judgment from question 5 (1: decrease, 2: remain, 3: increase) was translated to the 9-point Likert scale as 8: decrease, 5: remain, 2: increase, in order to form 
valid means and in order not to overemphasize extreme values. Question 7 on the tax position was not included in the aggregation as it represents a category in its own. 
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Table 5: Statistics on manipulation questions by group and treatment 
Group Treatment N Yes No Passed 
Experts Case A “Net-of-Tax” 25 24% (n=6) 76% (n=19) 76% (n=19) 
 Case B “Tax Detail” 24 88% (n=21) 13% (n=3) 88% (n=21) 
Students Case A “Net-of-Tax” 21 67% (n=14) 33% (n=7) 33% (n=7) 
 Case B “Tax Detail” 19 100% (n=19) 0% (n=0) 100% (n=19) 
 Total 89 
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Table 6: Statistics on judgments of participants who passed the manipulation test 
Questions Treatment  N Median Mean Std. dev. 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
        
1. Financial condition Case A “Net-of-Tax” 26 3 3.50 1.3928 0.9142 
(1: very good, 9: very poor) Case B “Tax Detail” 40 3 3.55 1.3578  
        
2. Investment risk Case A “Net-of-Tax” 26 3 3.88 1.5831 0.6708 
(1: low risk, 9: high risk) Case B “Tax Detail” 40 4 3.83 1.0834  
        
3. Payment obligation Case A “Net-of-Tax” 26 3 3.42 1.9010 0.9252 
(1: very good, 9: very bad)  Case B “Tax Detail” 40 3 3.35 1.6101  
        
4. Growth perspective Case A “Net-of-Tax” 24 3 3.46 1.2847 0.4404 
(1: very good, 9: very bad)  Case B “Tax Detail” 39 3 3.74 1.4818  
        
5. Profitability Case A “Net-of-Tax” 24 3 2.50 0.7802 0.6721 
(1: decrease, 2: remain, 3: increase)  Case B “Tax Detail” 39 3 2.49 0.6437  
        
6. Investment attractiveness Case A “Net-of-Tax” 26 3 3.88 1.5317 1.0000 
(1: very attractive, 9: very unattractive) Case B “Tax Detail” 39 3 3.87 1.5075  
        
7. Tax burden Case A “Net-of-Tax” 26 7 6.00 1.6492 0.7257 
(1: very low, 9: very high)  Case B “Tax Detail” 40 6 5.88 1.6043  
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Table 6.1: Statistics on judgment categories: all participants who passed manipulation check 
Questions Treatment  N Median Mean Std. dev. 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
        
Financial performance Case A “Net-of-Tax” 26 4.33 4.07 1.1037 0.3010  
(1: very good, 9: very poor) Case B “Tax Detail”  40 3.67 3.82 1.2240  
        
Investment conditions Case A “Net-of-Tax” 26 3.33 3.71 1.2161    0.4515 
(1: low risk, 9: high risk) Case B “Tax Detail”  40 3.67 3.83 1.0374  
 
The category of financial performance is composed of Q1 Financial condition, Q3 Payment obligation and Q5 Profitability. The category of investment conditions is 
composed of Q2 Growth perspective, Q4 Investment risk and Q6 Investment attractiveness. The data was aggregated by calculating the mean answers for each category. The 
profitability judgment from question 5 (1: decrease, 2: remain, 3: increase) was translated to the 9-point Likert scale as 8: decrease, 5: remain, 2: increase, in order to form 
valid means and in order not to overemphasize extreme values. Question 7 on the tax position was not included in the aggregation as it represents a category in its own. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
37 
 
Table 7: Statistics on judgments of experts by treatment 
Questions Treatment  N Median Mean Std. dev. 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
        
1. Financial condition Case A “Net-of-Tax” 25 3 3.76 1.7388 0.8770 
(1: very good, 9: very poor) Case B “Tax Detail”  24 3 3.54 1.2151  
         
2. Investment risk Case A “Net-of-Tax” 25 3 3.84 1.3748 0.4170 
(1: low risk, 9: high risk) Case B “Tax Detail”  24 4 4.00 1.2158  
         
3. Payment obligation Case A “Net-of-Tax” 25 3 3.48 1.8735 0.9918 
(1: very good, 9: very bad)  Case B “Tax Detail”  24 3 3.50 1.7693  
         
4. Growth perspective Case A “Net-of-Tax” 23 3 3.48 1.3774 0.5730 
(1: very good, 9: very bad)  Case B “Tax Detail”  24 3 3.71 1.4885  
         
5. Profitability Case A “Net-of-Tax” 23 1 1.52 0.7305 0.4458 
(1: decrease, 2: remain, 3: Increase)  Case B “Tax Detail”  23 2 1.62 0.5830  
         
6. Investment attractiveness Case A “Net-of-Tax” 25 4 4.16 1.5727 0.9587 
(1: very attractive, 9: very unattractive) Case B “Tax Detail”  24 4 4.17 1.6330  
         
7. Tax burden Case A “Net-of-Tax” 25 6 5.88 1.5895 0.8775 
(1: very low, 9: very high)  Case B “Tax Detail”  24 6 6.00 1.5604   
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Table 7.1: Statistics on judgment categories: Experts 
Questions Treatment  N Median Mean Std. dev. 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
        
Financial performance Case A “Net-of-Tax” 25 4.67 4.54 1.0815 0.3959 
(1: very good, 9: very poor) Case B “Tax Detail”  24 4.33 4.35 0.9853  
        
Investment conditions Case A “Net-of-Tax” 25 3.33 3.79 1.1259 0.3981 
(1: low risk, 9: high risk) Case B “Tax Detail”  24 3.67 3.96 1.0182  
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Table 8: Rearrangement of dataset 
 Subsample 1 Subsample 2 Subsample 3 Subsample 4 
Experts X X X   
Students X X   X 
Manipulation check 
passed 
X     X 
IFRS experience  X X     
Public accountant or 
auditor 
    X   
Case A “Net-of-Tax” (nA) 8 13 10 7 
Case B “Tax Detail” (nB) 12 13 6 19 
Total subjects (n) 20 26  16 26 
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Annex	[Not	intended	for	publication.]	
<Instruction>	
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<Questionnaire>	
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<Demographic	Data>	
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<Manipulation	Check>	
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Treatment A “Net of Tax” 
 
 
  
ABC Konzern ABC Konzern
Gesamtergebnisrechnung des Konzerns
2012 2011 2012 2011
in Mio. €  in Mio. €
Umsatzerlöse 34,412 30,239 Jahresüberschuss 2,455 1,622
Umsatzkosten -27,138 -24,773
Bruttoergebnis vom Umsatz 7,274 5,466 Zur Veräußerung verfügbare Wertpapiere -35 -6
  Zu Sicherungszwecken eingesetzte 
Vertriebskosten und allgemeine Verwaltungskosten -3,089 -2,764 Finanzinstrumente  -275 -170
Sonstige betriebliche Erträge 392 383 Währungsumrechnung ausländischer 
Sonstige betriebliche Aufwendungen -566 -529 Tochterunternehmen  84 333
Ergebnis vor Finanzergebnis 4,011 2,556 Versicherungsmathematische Gewinne / 
  Verluste aus leistungsorientierten Pensionszusagen, 
Ergebnis aus Equity-Bewertung 81 49 ähnlichen Verpflichtungen und Planvermögen -210 -101
Zinsen und ähnliche Erträge 382 343 Sonstiges Ergebnis nach Steuern aus
Zinsen und ähnliche Aufwendungen -472 -483  At-Equity bewerteten Beteiligungen  -21 10
Übriges Finanzergebnis -309 -38 Sonstiges Ergebnis nach Steuern  -457 66
Finanzergebnis -318 -129   
  Gesamtergebnis  1,998 1,688
Ergebnis vor Steuern 3,693 2,427  
  Gesamtergebnisanteil fremder Gesellschafter  13 8
Ertragsteuern -1,238 -805
Jahresüberschuss 2,455 1,622 Gesamtergebnisanteil der Aktionäre der ABC AG 1,985 1,680
  
Ergebnisanteil fremder Gesellschafter 13 8
Ergebnisanteil der Aktionäre der ABC AG 2,442 1,614
  
Ergebnis je Stammaktie in Euro 3.73 2.47  
Ergebnis je Vorzugsaktie in Euro 3.74 2.48
Verwässerungseffekte  -    –
Verwässertes Ergebnis je Stammaktie in Euro 3.73 2.47
Verwässertes Ergebnis je Vorzugsaktie in Euro 3.74 2.48
Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung des Konzerns A
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Treatment B “Tax Detail” 
 
 
ABC Konzern ABC Konzern
Gesamtergebnisrechnung des Konzerns
2012 2011 in Mio. € 2012 2011
in Mio. €  
Jahresüberschuss 2,455 1,622
Umsatzerlöse 34,412 30,239
Umsatzkosten -27,138 -24,773 Zur Veräußerung verfügbare Wertpapiere -36 -8
Bruttoergebnis vom Umsatz 7,274 5,466       Latente Steuern 1 2
        Nach Steuern -35 -6
Vertriebskosten und allgemeine Verwaltungskosten -3,089 -2,764  
Sonstige betriebliche Erträge 392 383 Zu Sicherungszwecken eingesetzte
Sonstige betriebliche Aufwendungen -566 -529 Finanzinstrumente  -401 -263
Ergebnis vor Finanzergebnis 4,011 2,556       Latente Steuern 126 93
        Nach Steuern -275 -170
Ergebnis aus Equity-Bewertung 81 49  
Zinsen und ähnliche Erträge 382 343 Währungsumrechnung ausländischer 84 333
Zinsen und ähnliche Aufwendungen -472 -483 Tochterunternehmen  
Übriges Finanzergebnis -309 -38       Latente Steuern 0 0
Finanzergebnis -318 -129       Nach Steuern 84 333
   
Ergebnis vor Steuern 3,693 2,427 Versicherungsmathematische Gewinne / 
  Verluste aus leistungsorientierten Pensionszusagen,
Ertragsteuern -1,238 -805  ähnlichen Verpflichtungen und Planvermögen -293 -138
Jahresüberschuss 2,455 1,622       Latente Steuern 83 37
        Nach Steuern -210 -101
Ergebnisanteil fremder Gesellschafter 13 8
Ergebnisanteil der Aktionäre der ABC AG 2,442 1,614 Sonstiges Ergebnis nach Steuern aus At-Equity -33 11
  bewerteten Beteiligungen  
Ergebnis je Stammaktie in Euro 3.73 2.47       Latente Steuern 12 -1
Ergebnis je Vorzugsaktie in Euro 3.74 2.48       Nach Steuern -21 10
Verwässerungseffekte  -    –    
Verwässertes Ergebnis je Stammaktie in Euro 3.73 2.47 Sonstiges Ergebnis nach Steuern  -457 66
Verwässertes Ergebnis je Vorzugsaktie in Euro 3.74 2.48
Gesamtergebnis  1,998 1,688
Gesamtergebnisanteil fremder Gesellschafter  13 8
Gesamtergebnisanteil der Aktionäre der ABC AG 1,985 1,680
Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung des Konzerns
 
B
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Commonly supplied financial statements 
 
 
 
 
 
ABC Konzern Passiva
in Mio. € 2012 2011
Gezeichnetes Kapital 328 328
in Mio. € 2012 2011  Kapitalrücklage 977 970
Gewinnrücklagen 13,051 11,245
Immaterielle Vermögenswerte 2,619 2,516 Kumuliertes übriges Eigenkapital -838 -591
Sachanlagen 5,843 5,713 Eigenkapital der Aktionäre der ABC AG 13,518 11,952
Vermietete Gegenstände 11,557 9,544
At-Equity bewertete Beteiligungen 151 106 Anteile anderer Gesellschafter 33 13
Sonstige Finanzanlagen 281 89 Eigenkapital 13,551 11,965
Forderungen aus Finanzdienstleistungen 14,664 13,563
Finanzforderungen 851 933 Rückstellungen für Pensionen 1,092 781
Latente Ertragsteuern 963 697 Sonstige Rückstellungen 1,575 1,361
Sonstige Vermögenswerte 284 346 Latente Ertragsteuern 1,637 1,700
Langfristige Vermögenswerte 37,213 33,507 Finanzverbindlichkeiten 18,798 17,917
 Sonstige Verbindlichkeiten 1,456 1,292
Vorräte 4,819 3,883 Langfristige Rückstellungen und Verbindlichkeiten 24,558 23,051
Forderungen aus Lieferungen und Leistungen 1,643 1,165
Forderungen aus Finanzdienstleistungen 10,007 9,119 Sonstige Rückstellungen 1,551 1,413
Finanzforderungen 1,876 1,631 Laufende Ertragsteuern 682 599
Laufende Ertragsteuern 597 583 Finanzverbindlichkeiten 15,190 13,260
Sonstige Vermögenswerte 1,672 1,479 Verbindlichkeiten aus Lieferungen und Leistungen 2,670 2,175
Zahlungsmittel und Zahlungsmitteläquivalente 3,888 3,716 Sonstige Verbindlichkeiten 3,513 2,620
Kurzfristige Vermögenswerte 24,502 21,576 Kurzfristige Rückstellungen und Verbindlichkeiten 23,606 20,067
 
Bilanzsumme 61,715 55,083 Bilanzsumme 61,715 55,083
Konzernbilanz zum 31. Dezember
Aktiva
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Commonly supplied financial statements 
 
ABC Konzern
 
in Mio. €
 
1 Januar 2011 328 961 -792 10,623 -874 10 106 10,362 7 10,369
Jahresüberschuss 0 0 0 1,614 0 0 0 1,614 8 1,622
Sonstiges Ergebnis nach Steuern 0 0 -101 0 343 -6 -170 66 0 66
Gesamtergebnis 2011 0 0 -101 1,614 343 -6 -170 1,680 8 1,688
Agio aus Kapitalerhöhung für 
Vorzugsaktien  0 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 9
Dividendenzahlungen 0 0 0 -99 0 0 0 -99 0 -99
Übrige Veränderungen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2
31 December 2011 328 970 -893 12,138 -531 4 -64 11,952 13 11,965
 
 
 
in Mio. €
1 January 2012 328 970 -893 12,138 -531 4 -64 11,952 13 11,965
Jahresüberschuss 0 0 0 2,442 0 0 0 2,442 13 2,455
Sonstiges Ergebnis nach Steuern 0 0 -210 0 63 -35 -275 -457 0 -457
Gesamtergebnis 2012 0 0 -210 2,442 63 -35 -275 1,985 13 1,998
Kapitalerhöhung aus Genehmigtem Kapital 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 7
Dividendenzahlungen 0 0 0 -426 0 0 0 -426 0 -426
Übrige Veränderungen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7
31 Dezember 2012 328 977 -1,103 14,154 -468 -31 -339 13,518 33 13,551
Entwicklung des Konzerneigenkapitals
Gewinnrücklagen
Pensions-
zusagen
Sonstige 
Gewinnrücklagen
Gezeichnetes 
Kapital
Kapital 
rücklage
Gewinnrücklagen Kumuliertes übriges Eigenkapital
Gezeichnetes 
Kapital
Kapital 
rücklage
Eigenkapital 
der Aktionäre 
der ABC AG
Anteile 
anderer 
Gesell-
schafter
Gesamt
Kumuliertes übriges Eigenkapital
 Unterschiede 
aus Währungs-
umrechnung
Wertpapier
e
Derivative 
Finanz-
instrumente
Eigenkapital 
der Aktionäre 
der ABC AG
Anteile 
anderer 
Gesell-
schafter
GesamtPensions-
zusagen
Sonstige 
Gewinnrücklagen
 Unterschiede 
aus Währungs-
umrechnung
Wertpapier
e
Derivative 
Finanz-
instrumente
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Commonly supplied financial statements 
 
ABC Konzern
in Mio. € 2012 2011
Jahresüberschuss 2,455 1,622
Überleitung zwischen Jahresüberschuss und Mittelzufluss/-abfluss aus 
der betrieblichen Tätigkeit
Laufende Ertragsteuern 1,433 715
Sonstige Zinsen und ähnliche Erträge /  Aufwendungen 1 21
Abschreibungen auf das übrige Anlagevermögen 1,827 1,931
Veränderung der Rückstellungen 389 455
Veränderung der Vermieteten Gegenstände -190 444
Veränderung der Forderungen aus Finanzdienstleistungen -1,418 -2,308
Veränderung der Latenten Steuern -169 174
Sonstige zahlungsunwirksame Erträge und Aufwendungen 74 -347
Ergebnis aus dem Verkauf von Anlagevermögen und Wertpapieren - 3
Ergebnis aus Equity-Bewertung -81 -49
Veränderung des Working Capital
   Veränderung der Vorräte -858 -585
   Veränderung der Forderungen aus Lieferungen und Leistungen -400 -214
   Veränderung der Verbindlichkeiten aus Lieferungen und Leistungen 450 597
Veränderung der sonstigen betrieblichen Aktiva und Passiva 588 286
Gezahlte Ertragsteuern -1,351 -659
Erhaltene Zinsen 107 74
Mittelzufluss/-abfluss aus der betrieblichen Tätigkeit 2,857 2,160
Investitionen in Immaterielle Vermögenswerte und Sachanlagen -1,839 -1,631
Erlöse aus Abgängen von Immateriellen Vermögenswerten und Sachanlagen 26 28
Investitionen in Finanzanlagen -271 -40
Nettoauszahlung aus dem Kauf der ICL-Gruppe -298 -
Erlöse aus dem Abgang von Finanzanlagen 11 11
Zahlungsausgänge durch den Kauf von Wertpapieren -1,037 -1,362
Zahlungseingänge aus dem Verkauf von Wertpapieren 659 399
Mittelzufluss /-abfluss aus der Investitionstätigkeit -2,749 -2,595
Einzahlungen in das Eigenkapital 7 9
Zahlung von Dividenden für das Vorjahr -426 -99
Gezahlte Zinsen -41 -111
Aufnahme von Anleihen 2,949 2,289
Rückzahlung von Anleihen -2,667 -1,703
Konzerninterne Finanzierungen  - -
Veränderung der Sonstigen Finanzverbindlichkeiten 96 -146
Veränderung der Commercial Paper 124 16
Mittelzufluss  /  -abfluss aus der Finanzierungstätigkeit 42 255
  
Wechselkursbedingte Veränderung der Zahlungsmittel und 
Zahlungsmitteläquivalente -6 10
Konsolidierungskreisbedingte Veränderung der Zahlungsmittel und 
Zahlungsmitteläquivalente 28 2
Veränderung der Zahlungsmittel und Zahlungsmitteläquivalente 172 -168
Zahlungsmittel und Zahlungsmitteläquivalente am 1 Januar 3,716 3,884
Zahlungsmittel und Zahlungsmitteläquivalente am 31 Dezember 3,888 3,716
Kapitalflussrechnung des Konzerns
